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Much of our day-to-day wayﬁnding behaviour takes place in familiar large-scale urban environments, yet there is a dearth of studies
examining how wayﬁnding unfolds on a second-by-second basis in this context. Here we used a retrospective verbal report protocol, eye
tracking and a highly accurate virtual reality simulation of a real city (London, UK) to examine this issue. Subjects, who were taxi
drivers, were able to produce extremely detailed accounts of what they had been thinking during wayﬁnding, which were validated by
independent eye-tracking data. There was a high degree of consistency in the types of thoughts across subjects, permitting classiﬁcation
into a number of distinct categories. Moreover, it was possible to quantify the number of thoughts in each category, their durations and
temporal order. Detailed analysis of the verbal reports provided new insights into the processes and strategies involved, and highlighted a
greater range of thoughts than has previously been reported in studies of wayﬁnding. By analysing the temporal order of thoughts it was
possible to identify speciﬁc relationships between categories. Some of these relationships were predicted by current cognitive models of
wayﬁnding, others were novel, thus shedding new light on how navigation unfolds in a busy city.
r 2008 Elsevier Ltd.
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Finding one’s way in spatially extended environments is
essential for survival and requires a wide range of cognitive
abilities. Pre-eminent among these is the ability to make use
of long-term spatial memory to guide wayﬁnding. An
understanding of how we might mentally represent large-
scale space has been gained from a variety of tests such as
sketching maps, direction pointing and giving route
descriptions (Chase, 1982; Garling & Garling, 1988;
Giraudo & Peruch, 1988a, 1988b; Golledge, 1999; Pailhous
1970, 1984; Peruch, Giraudo, & Garling, 1989; Thorndyke
& Hayes-Roth, 1982). These studies suggest that multiple,
qualitatively different types of spatial representations can
support wayﬁnding, including route knowledge (knowing
the directions to turn at locations/landmarks) and survey-
like knowledge (an integrated knowledge of the spatial08 Elsevier Ltd.
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Open access under CC BY license. relationships between locations/landmarks) (Siegel &
White, 1975; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). It is
thought that survey-like knowledge, also referred to as
cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948), endows us with the ability
to take detours and shortcuts in familiar environments.
In addition to the use of static tasks, such as sketching
maps, examination of in situ ongoing behaviour during
wayﬁnding has provided additional insights into the use of
spatial representations, and identiﬁed factors affecting
performance. Such factors include subjects’ spatial proces-
sing abilities, their familiarity with the environment, the
density/salience of landmarks, and the layout of the
environment (Foo, Warren, Duchon, & Tarr, 2005; Gillner
& Mallot, 1998; Golledge, 1999; Holscher, Meilinger,
Vrachliotis, Brosamle, & Knauff, 2007; Janzen, Schade,
Katz, & Hermann, 2001; Newman et al., 2006; Thorndyke
& Hayes-Roth, 1982; Wiener, Schnee, & Mallot, 2004). In
particular, and of primary interest here, investigating how
routes are chosen or planned has proved useful for
identifying a number of wayﬁnding strategies (Conroy-
Dalton, 2003; Golledge, 1995; Hochmair & Frank, 2002;
Pailhous, 1970, 1984; Wiener & Mallot, 2003; Wiener et al.,
2004). For example, Pailhous (1970, 1984) found that
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primary network of streets to facilitate navigation. By
contrast, in another strategy known as the least-angle
strategy, paths are chosen that minimize deviation from the
angle pointing directly to the goal (Conroy-Dalton, 2003).
Different again is the fine-to-coarse planning heuristic that
argues routes are planned in ﬁne detail in the currently
occupied region, but only coarsely when planning naviga-
tion between regions (Wiener & Mallot, 2003). Finally, the
least-decision-load strategy speciﬁes that subjects will often
choose the path with the least number of possible decision
points (Wiener et al., 2004).
To account for this range of empirical ﬁndings, a number
of cognitive models of wayﬁnding have been proposed
(Garling, Book, & Lindberg, 1984; Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers,
Tecuci, & Stankiewicz, 2003; Passini, 1981, 1984; Peponis,
Zimring, & Choi, 1990; Stern & Portugali, 1999; Timpf,
Volta, Pollock, & Egenhofer, 1992). All models distinguish
between the processes of: (a) planning the route and (b)
executing the plan, and generally contain a hierarchy of
staged processes that unfold sequentially and iteratively
during wayﬁnding. The models differ in the features they
emphasize and situations they cover. Some deal with
selecting the route to multiple destinations (Garling et al.,
1984), others with navigating in unfamiliar environments
(Garling et al., 1984; Peponis et al., 1990) or city streets
(Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003;
Timpf et al., 1992). For example, Kuipers’ models
(Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003) build on the ﬁndings
of Pailhous (1969, 1984) by using a primary network of
roads to facilitate navigation. Timpf et al.’s (1992) model
deals with the translation from route plans into the actions
necessary to perform driving manoeuvres.
Whilst observing in situ wayﬁnding has generated
empirical and theoretical advances, one signiﬁcant limita-
tion is that mere observation can make it difﬁcult to
determine the reasons or intentions behind some of the
different actions performed. For example, stopping at a
junction might be motivated by the need to reorient, look
ahead, make a decision, or any number of other reasons. In
order to dissociate such possibilities several studies have
employed verbal report protocols (Chebat, Gelinas-Che-
bat, & Therrien, 2005; Dogu & Erkip, 2000; Gerber &
Kwan, 1994; Holscher et al., 2007; Kato & Takeuchi, 2003;
Passini, 1981, 1984; Titus & Everett, 1996). These protocols
involve subjects either ‘thinking aloud’ during the task
(concurrent verbal reports) or describing what they
remember thinking during a structured interview after the
experimental task (retrospective verbal reports) (Ericsson
& Simon, 1980). The contents of the verbal reports are
analysed with a pre-determined classiﬁcation scheme
usually developed from pilot studies. These classiﬁcation
schemes make use of commonalities in the statements
contained in the verbal reports to derive a number of
relevant ‘thought’ categories. Examining the categories and
their contents can then be used to understand the cognitive
task in question and potential strategies employed. By theirnature, verbal report protocols can only give insight into
the processes which subjects are aware of and are able to
verbalize. Nevertheless, the reports gained can help provide
evidence to distinguish between competing models seeking
to explain cognition during a task (see Ericsson & Simon,
1980; Jack & Roepstorff, 2003).
Passini (1981, 1984, 1992) was the ﬁrst to critically assess
the wayﬁnding process with a verbal report protocol. His
results, in agreement with other models, provided evidence
for two core stages in wayﬁnding: formulating the route
plan and executing the plan. Analysis of the verbal reports
also identiﬁed a hierarchical organization in the route
plans, with decisions at the top relating to over-arching
goals, and decisions at the bottom related to sub-tasks.
Route planning elements always contained two parts: a
behaviour component (e.g. turn left) and a location/
landmark speciﬁer (e.g. at the central square). Thus,
Passini argued that wayﬁnding could be conceptualized
as a process in which route plans are initially set up and
executed by actions at the appropriate place and time
leading ﬁnally to the goal. In his model, plans generate
expectancies to ﬁnd particular locations/landmarks in
order to perform the actions. These actions are triggered
when a match occurs between a mental image of the
expected locations/landmark and the experience of seeing
it. When there is no such match a new plan must be
formulated to solve the problem.
Since Passini’s (1981, 1984, 1992) seminal studies, verbal
reports been used to examine how a number of factors
affect wayﬁnding cognition and strategy use. These factors
have included the use of maps (Gerber & Kwan, 1994),
subjects’ navigational aptitude (Holscher et al., 2007; Kato
& Takeuchi, 2003), familiarity with the environment
(Chebat et al., 2005; Holscher et al., 2007), the layout of
the environment (Holscher et al., 2007) and wayﬁnding in
the context of shopping (Chebat et al., 2005; Dogu &
Erkip, 2000; Titus & Everett, 1996). Findings from these
studies have generally agreed with Passini’s (1981, 1984)
model, and have helped to identify the use of a number of
additional wayﬁnding strategies (Gerber & Kwan, 1994;
Holscher et al., 2007; Kato & Takeuchi, 2003). For
example, Holscher et al. (2007) found some subjects
completely planned the whole route before setting off,
while others would formulate only partial plans. The latter
was found to be associated with poorer performance. Kato
and Takeuchi (2003) found that some subjects were able to
ﬂexibly use a range of information to navigate, whereas
others employed ineffective strategies, such as using parked
cars as landmarks.
While these studies have shed some light on the cognitive
processes during wayﬁnding, several important issues
remain unexplored. The environments of the previous
studies that used verbal reports were either indoors
(Chebat et al., 2005; Dogu & Erkip, 2000; Holscher
et al., 2007; Passini, 1981, 1984; Titus & Everett, 1996) or
unfamiliar (Gerber & Kwan, 1994; Kato & Takeuchi,
2003). Thus, despite the fact that much of our daily
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cognitive processes involved in navigating them has yet to
be examined. Prior studies have generally focused on
decision making or strategy use, ignoring other compo-
nents such as the visual processing of the environment or
the entities within it. No study has examined how
wayﬁnding unfolds on second-by-second basis in a large-
scale environment. Appreciating the temporally ﬁne-
grained behaviour during navigation could give important
insights into the underlying spatial representations and the
wayﬁnding processes that act upon it. Related to this,
quantitative examination of the temporal relationships
between different types of thoughts during wayﬁnding has
also been largely ignored. Finally, there has been little
attempt to use the information in verbal reports to
critically evaluate different cognitive models of wayﬁnding
(Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003;
Passini, 1981, 1984; Peponis et al., 1990; Stern & Portugali,
1999; Timpf et al., 1992).
Here we addressed these outstanding issues by using a
retrospective verbal report protocol, eye tracking and a
highly accurate virtual reality simulation of a real city
(London, UK) to explore the second-by-second thoughts
accompanying wayﬁnding. We also used the information
obtained from the verbal reports to examine temporal
contingencies in the thoughts, and to evaluate cognitive
models of wayﬁnding.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty healthy right-handed male licensed London taxi
drivers participated in the experiment (mean age: 49.8
years, SD: 8.5 years, range: 27–59 years). Taxi drivers were
used in order to investigate wayﬁnding in subjects familiar
with the environment, and to provide a consistent level of
performance. The average time spent working as a taxi
driver was 18.3 years (SD: 10.9 years, range: 1–38 years).
All had either lived in London their entire lives or for the
vast majority of it and were naı¨ve to the stimuli used in the
experiment. All subjects gave informed written consent to
participation in accordance with the local research ethics
committee.
2.2. The virtual environment
The video game ‘The Getaway’ (r Sony Computer
Entertainment Europe, 2002) run on a Sony Playstation2
(r Sony Computer Games Inc.) was used to present
subjects with a ground-level interactive ﬁrst person
perspective view of a simulation of central London, UK
(see Fig. 1, and Spiers & Maguire, 2006a for a movie of
navigation through the environment). While desk-top
virtual reality simulations have their limitations, such as
a lack of peripheral and binocular visual information, there
are numerous advantages to using VR. In the current studyuse of VR London made it possible to assess navigation in
a familiar yet complex large-scale environment in a
controlled way that simply would not be possible with in
situ navigation in this city. In addition, use of VR
permitted recording of subjects’ performance and allowed
for collection of eye-tracking data (for more on VR versus
real environments see Morganti, Carassa, & Geminani,
2007; Peruch & Gaunet, 1998; Richardson, Montello, &
Hegarty, 1999; Stanton, Wilson, & Foreman, 2002). In the
virtual London game used in this experiment over 110 km
(70 miles) of driveable roads have been accurately
recreated from Ordinance Survey map data, covering
approximately 50 km2 (20 square miles) of the city centre.
The game designers decided to truly recreate the city and a
large team of photographers walked the streets of central
London for two years recording details of the city.
Buildings, shops, the one-way systems, working trafﬁc
lights, the busy London trafﬁc and an abundance of
Londoners going about their business are all included. The
‘Free Roaming’ mode of the game was used, permitting
free navigation with the normal game scenarios suspended.
Subjects moved through the environment in a virtual
London taxicab controlled using a game controller,
consisting of two joysticks providing analogue control of
acceleration, braking and steering left and right. The
virtual taxi had a higher degree of controllability than
many of the other vehicles in the game, and its low top
virtual speed could be maintained easily. Even slight
contact between a subject’s vehicle and other vehicles
could result in a crash which would prematurely terminate
the experiment. Therefore a ‘cheat’ modiﬁcation was
employed using Action Replay Max software (r Datel
Design and Development Ltd., 2003) which prevented such
crashes. Subjects were instructed to drive ‘legally’ as they
would in actual London. To assess the ecological validity
of the virtual simulation, during the pilot testing, subjects
were asked to comment on the similarity of the game to the
real city, and their sense of ‘presence’. All remarked that
Central London (where the experiment was set) in
particular was highly accurate and detailed with a high
level of presence. Following the experiment proper subjects
were asked how similar the simulation and task was their
everyday experience. All of the taxi drivers conﬁrmed that
the game was very reminiscent of their experience of
driving in central London.
2.3. Pre-test training and familiarization
Two weeks prior to testing, subjects were given over 2 h
of practice with the game controls by asking them to
navigate to various locations in areas of environment not
used in the experimental task. To avoid waiting for long
periods at red trafﬁc lights, subjects were familiarized with
treating all trafﬁc lights as green, but were otherwise
required to comply with all other road trafﬁc regulations in
the UK. Thirty minutes before testing subjects were again
given further practice in an area not used in experimental
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. Virtual London (UK). Panel (A) shows a map of the region of the simulation of London that was used in the navigation task (not all the minor
streets shown were included in the video game). Reproduced by permission of Geographers’ A-Z Map Co. Ltd. r Crown Copyright 2005. All rights
reserved. Licence number 100017302. Coloured lines indicate examples of typical routes driven by subjects to each of seven destinations during the
navigation task. Panel (B) shows example views from within the video game ‘The Getaway’ r 2002 Sony Computer Entertainment Europe. Left image
shows a view at Trafalgar Square, right image shows a view at Piccadilly Circus. These images are reproduced with the kind permission of Sony Computer
Entertainment Europe.
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respond to a set of recorded customers’ requests to take
them to destinations in London. Prior to testing, subjects
were told the locations they would be starting from in the
experimental tasks, but not the order.
2.4. Experimental task
The experimental tasks took place during functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) brain scanning. De-
tails of the scanning parameters and related fMRI analyses
can be found in Spiers and Maguire (2006a, 2006b, 2007a,
2007b). In the experimental task, navigation was tested inblocks where subjects responded to customers’ requests
(heard via head phones) by delivering them to their
destinations. During each block one route was tested.
Seven routes were included which were (in order): Kings
Cross to the Middlesex Hospital (initially to Guy’s
Hospital), Trafalgar Square to the Royal Courts of Justice
(initially to the Old Bailey), St. Giles Circus to Peter Street
in Soho (initially to Paddington Station), St. Martin’s Place
to Leicester Square (initially to Covent Garden), Piccadilly
Circus to Leicester Square (initially to St. James’s Square),
Buckingham Palace to the American Embassy (initially to
Shepard’s Market) and the American Embassy to Cavend-
ish Square (initially to Manchester Square). When the
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and 5 s to orient themselves in the environment. Following
this they heard a customer request a destination (mean
duration 2.0 s). For all routes, at some point during
navigation the subjects heard customers request a change
of destination (mean duration 3.0 s). For three of the routes
an additional request to avoid a location or go via a
location was made by the customer (mean duration 3.7 s).
Requests for a change of destination or requests to go via
another location occurred at time points that varied
along each route and were unknown to the subject but
predetermined by the experimenters. Two subjects com-
pleted only four routes, in one case due to discomfort, the
other due to a technical problem. Each block of navigation
ended when either the subject reached the destination or
when a predetermined period of time elapsed. The
maximum time taken to get to each of the destinations
was between 3 and 6min (mean: 3.8min, SD: 1.1min).
Each block of navigation was separated by a period of rest
in which the subjects viewed a blank white screen for 60 s.
Total mean time for the experimental task was 31min 35 s
(SD: 4min 9 s).
2.5. Video recording
In order to debrief subjects and create an independent
record of eye tracking, two videos were recorded during the
experimental task. Video output from the Playstation 2 was
split into three ways: (1) to a projector presenting stimuli to
the subject on a screen in the MRI scanner (view angle of
27.61), (2) to a VHS video recorder for debrieﬁng and (3) to
a video mixer to create an eye-tracking video. Video output
going into the video mixer was combined with camera
footage of a stopwatch manually synchronized with the
time stamp on the debrieﬁng video. Gaze position cross
hairs collected via an ASL504LRO infra-red eye-tracker
(Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA) were over-
laid onto the video sent to the mixed video recording in 14
subjects. Accurately calibrated eye-gaze tracking was
achieved in nine subjects.
2.6. Verbal report protocol
Immediately after the experimental task the subjects
were taken to a separate room where they were given a
surprise debrieﬁng with a verbal report protocol (Ericsson
& Simon, 1980). In this debrieﬁng, subjects watched the
video of their performance during the experimental task.
They were carefully instructed to describe what they
remembered thinking, step-by-step, during their original
performance. The interview proceeded at a pace deter-
mined by the subject, with the video being paused and
rewound by the interviewer where necessary to capture the
details provided by the subject. A new copy of the original
video was recorded during the interview with the voices of
the subject and interviewer collected by a microphone
overlaid. In accordance with the methods described byEricsson and Simon (1980), the interviewer followed a
predetermined protocol during the interview. A subject’s
report was interrupted as little as possible, the interviewer
intervening only to improve the subject’s speciﬁcation of
the onset and duration of thoughts where possible, and on
occasion where clariﬁcation was required to later aid
analysis. The mean duration of the collection of the verbal
reports was 108.9min (SD: 16.9min).
2.7. Analysis of the retrospective verbal reports
Anonymized audio information from the verbal report
interviews was transcribed by a professional transcription
agency who were blind to the purpose of the experiment. By
comparing the transcript with the time stamp from the
original performance video, information about the timing of
the thoughts was incorporated into the transcripts and any
errors or unclear statements rectiﬁed. Each statement in the
transcript was then classiﬁed into one of a set of categories,
and where appropriate sub-categories (see Table 1), and its
onset and duration recorded to create a segmented timeline
of every subject’s experience of every route (see example in
Fig. 2). Unambiguous categories were predetermined by
analysis of common repeated statements in the verbal reports
of four subjects who took part in an in-depth pilot study
prior to the main experiment. This process was also guided
by ﬁndings from previous studies employing verbal report
protocols and wayﬁnding tasks (Chebat et al., 2005; Dogu &
Erkip, 2000; Gerber & Kwan, 1994; Holscher et al., 2007;
Kato & Takeuchi, 2003; Passini, 1981, 1984; Titus & Everett,
1996). The pilot study also served to create a guide to aid
classiﬁcation and generate a protocol for the initial collection
of the verbal reports. The independent eye-tracking video
was used to aid the identiﬁcation of onsets and durations
where the subjects reported looking at a feature in the
environment, and so served as an external measure to
validate the procedure. Environmental features consisted of
static structures (e.g. buildings and statues) and moving
objects (e.g. vehicles and pedestrians). For each report of
looking at a feature in the environment, the eye-tracking
video corresponding to that time point was examined to
determine when, to the nearest second, a saccade to the
feature was made and how long ﬁxation of the feature
occurred in seconds. To assess the degree to which the verbal
reports could be reliably categorized, a second experimenter
classiﬁed the verbal reports contained in 36 random extracts.
Of note, it was not just taxi drivers who were able to produce
detailed retrospective verbal reports. Several non-taxi driver
subjects who navigated in the game through areas of the city
they were familiar with were able to produce reports as
accurate as those of the taxi drivers.
2.8. Analysis of the temporal precedence of
thought categories
In order to understand the temporal relationships
between categories, we examined whether the thoughts
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Table 1
Category deﬁnitions and example extracts from verbal reports
Route planning:
initial
Planning after a request from a customer to be
taken to a speciﬁc destination
Extract 1
Customer Please could you take me to the Old Bailey?
Sub. 1 I thought, great, turn right, straight down the
Strand, straight down Fleet Street and then left up
to the Old Bailey
Experimenter Did you picture the Old Bailey?
Sub. 1 No. I don’t think I did. I just know where it is
Extract 2
Customer Please could you take me to Guys’ Hospital?
Sub. 13 As soon as he said Guy’s Hospital it’s like I’m
sitting here in the cab, I know Guy’s Hospital is
there (subject points in the correct direction to
Guy’s Hospital). I know it’s in that direction. So I
know Guy’s is now south east. In my body it’s
behind me and to the east and to the south.
Straight away I can seey it’s like I can see
through all the buildings. It’s like if I said to you
picture from here toy the other room where we
went, you can picture the whole surroundings,
can’t you?
Experimenter Yes
Sub. 13 And the door and the hallway. That’s how it is
with the roads
Extract 3
Customer Sorry, no, I need to get to Peter Street, the one off
Wardour street
Sub. 3 I’m thinking where the hell is it in Wardour street
(emphatic tone). So then, well I know instinctively
I’ve got to turn left cos it’s—I know where it isn’t.
I know one little street that I’m not sure ofy it
must be that one, that was me instinct
Experimenter Did you picture Wardour street?
Sub. 3 I had to picture the whole length of Wardour
street in my head very quickly just knocking off
the streets that I knew and then Peter Street was
this little street. I kinda ﬁgured it might be that
one cos I knew it wasn’t this one, this one, this
one, or this one
Extract 4
Customer I’d like to go via Glasshouse Street, please
Sub. 14 Well, I knew that’s just by Piccadilly Circus,
which is over to our right. At this stage I don’t
think I thought east or west. I knew it was like sort
of two o’clock from here
Experimenter Was there any plan?
Sub. 14 Well, I knew I was in a one way street so I just had
to carry on
Route planning:
spontaneous—
filling-in
Planning the next stage of the journey
Extract 5
Sub. 3 So as I turn then I think right now—okay when I
get to the top there’s a one-way system so yo’re
forced left and right, left and right, there’s a
multitude of ways you can go from here so—but I
know I’ve got to go to the end of the street
because fundamentally I don’t want to take a left
before that
Extract 6
Sub. 7 I was going to use Brunswick Square and
Guildford Street. Well, I wasn’t too sure whether
to come a bit low with it and go Montague Street,
Great Russell and then go up Earnshaw. That was
a bit long winded I thought. Then I thought well
we can get Judd Street and we can go down
Tavistock Place. There was three different options
came in my head
Route planning:
spontaneous—
re-planning
Altering the current route plan
Extract 7
Sub. 12 And then I think hold on, there’s another way. It’s
like I said before, there always seems to be an
option comes in your way. Um, so I thought well,
okay then, if I can turn right, then I’m going to go
up through the back of there and across the
church
Extract 8
Sub. 9 Here, I’ve thought oh no, I’ve gone past
Marlborough Gate, but I thought well, it doesn’t
mattery I’ll just do Piccadilly
Action planning Planning future movements with the vehicle
Extract 9
Sub. 2 I just thought, well, I’ll go through there and once
I turn right I’ll stay on the right hand-side
Extract 10
Sub. 6 I’m thinking, I must get over to the right now
Extract 11
Sub. 9 I’m just thinking about getting over onto the left
hand lane to turn left
Coasting Navigating automatically without any directed
thoughts
Extract 12
Sub. 1 You go into automatic pilot
Experimenter Were you were in automatic pilot here?
Sub. 1 Once I’d seen the underpass, yes. Because
everything is mapped out and I know which way
I’m going
Extract 13
Sub. 3 I’ve kinda switched off here, just keeping the car
straight really. I use the term switched off, you
don’t actually switch off, but you switch off
thinking about your direction and maybe thinking
about what’s going on
Extract 14
Sub. 11 It’s as if someone else is doing it for you, all you
are is a computer and you just program in and off
it goes
Extract 15
Sub. 20 I’ve got a dead straight run for quite a bit, so you
don’t need to think much at all
Expectation Looking out for the next expected environmental
feature
Extract 16
Sub. 1 Now I’m looking for the Euston underpass
Table 1 (continued)
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Extract 17
Sub. 2 I was expecting to see ity about now
Extract 18
Sub. 6 Now I’m going to look out for it (Mortimer street)
Experimenter What was it that told you to start looking out for
it?
Sub. 6 I’m thinking I’ve traveled a long way along here
now
Extract 19
Sub. 21 Should be going downhill now, that’s what I was
thinking
Expectation
confirmation
Detecting the presence of an expected
environmental feature
Extract 20
Sub. 1 And then all of a suddeny a little bit further on
you go through these lightsy and there it is.
There’s the cab shelter on the left-hand side
Extract 21
Sub. 7 But then, that’s it, I knew that was Glasshouse
Street because that’s the shape of it
Extract 22
Sub. 9 And then when that yellow van comes up, yes,
that’s Orion House
Expectation
violation
Detecting the absence of an expected
environmental feature
Extract 23
Sub. 6 I thought, oh, bloody hell, they’ve blocked it off
Extract 24
Sub. 7 And then we come round here and then I got to
about there and I thought oh, no, please no
(emphatic tone). And then it was conﬁrmed it was
closed
Extract 25
Sub. 14 Well, now I knew that I was coming up to
Tottenham Court Road, I wanted to go straight
on and here I saw that I couldn’t
Visual inspection Visual inspection of an environmental feature
Extract 26
Sub. 3 As I’m going along here, I thought oh look that’s
Dwight [Statue of General Eisenhower]
Extract 27
Sub. 11 I was looking at it and I thought that’s the
American Embassy
Extract 28
Sub. 17 As I turn, I’m looking at Boots [chemist shop] and
the other shops
Extract 29
Sub. 7 I’m just checking it [the street] and I could see the
no entry arrow there
Monitoring
traffic
Watching moving trafﬁc in the environment
Extract 30
Sub. 5 Well, the bus is a nuisance. You can’t see in front
of it. It’s in the way
Extract 31
Sub. 7
Table 1 (continued)
I’m looking at the cabs over the other side in the
bus lane
Extract 32
Sub. 9 What I thought of here was: I’ll let that car go and
I was very relieved that it accelerated away from
me
Theory of mind Thinking about other people’s thoughts/
intentions
Extract 33
Sub. 11 I mean he [the customer] may be thinking I’m
going to go down to Piccadilly Circus, back up
Shaftsbury Avenue and in through that way, I
don’t know, you know, or he may have got
Glasshouse Street and Brewer Street mixed up
Extract 34
Sub. 12 [a car pulls out in front of him and the subject has to
break to avoid a collision] I thought what’s he
doing?.. Why would he do that? There’s a line
there, he’s got to stop, you know, and thaty I’ve
got preference
Rule related Thinking about the one-way system and road
trafﬁc rules
Extract 35
Sub. 3 And then I realised, no it’s one-way, I can’t go
that way
Extract 36
Sub. 11 And then there, I thought to myself: don’t park on
the zigzags [road markings indicating no stopping]
Extract 37
Sub. 9 I thought no, no, no, it’s a one way street I won’t
do that
Emotions—
happy
Change in emotional state to being happy
Extract 38
Sub. 6 I’m very happy with the way I’ve driven it now.
I’m chuffed to bits
Emotions—
angry
Change in emotional state to being angry
Extract 39
Sub. 21 I was getting annoyed, I was actually getting
annoyed
Emotions—
anxious
Change in emotional state to being anxious
Extract 40
Sub. 9 And I’m scared, like a horse, frightened by the
railings
Statements in square brackets and italics provide additional information
about the environment or people referred to by the subject. Statements in
parentheses and italics provide additional information about the subject’s
gestures and voice tone.
Table 1 (continued)
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Fig. 2. The route driven by an example subject (subject 3) from Charing Cross Road to Peter Street in Soho is shown segmented into different colour-
coded thought categories (see explanatory key on the right-hand side) derived from the subject’s verbal report. Note that turning, not in the key, is shown
in black on the route. The route is indirect due to the one-way road system in Soho.
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belonging to other categories more or less often than
would be expected by chance. This was done by construct-
ing a contingency table for each subject which was a
transition matrix of all the possible pairings of categories.
This table contained the number of observed occurrences in
which events of each category directly preceded the events
of each other category. For each pair we also calculated the
number of occurrences that would be expected by chance.
This was done by multiplying together the number of
events in each category and then dividing by the total
number of events across all categories. We then collapsed
across subjects by summing the number of observed
occurrences and summing the number of expected occur-
rences in each subject’s table to create one table. A w2 test
was used to test whether the number of observed
occurrences provided a good ﬁt to the number of expected
occurrences in this table, with the degrees of free-
dom ¼ (number of columns 1) (number of rows 1).
If a signiﬁcant result was obtained, a w2 test was used for
each category to test whether events from this category
preceded events in each of the other categories more or less
often than was expected from chance. If a signiﬁcant result
was obtained in any of these w2 tests, sign tests were then
used to probe individual category pairs. Sign tests
examined whether there were signiﬁcantly more subjects
for whom the number of observed occurrences was greater
or less than the number of expected occurrences.
3. Results
Aspects of the ﬁndings from this rich and ﬂexible data set
involving fMRI have been reported elsewhere (Spiers &Maguire, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). We now report new
analyses focused on the separate issue of understanding
cognitive process during wayﬁnding, and how they inform
models of wayﬁnding.
3.1. Behavioural performance and verbal reports
All subjects completed the task successfully with a mean
of 94% (SD: 9%) of their routes being efﬁcient. An
efﬁcient route was one where the subject moved continually
closer to the goal destination given the constraints of
London’s one-way system and occasional obstructed
streets that were included in the game (see Fig. 1). Using
mapping software (Map24(UK): http://www.uk.map24.
com) it was possible to determine that subjects travelled a
mean total distance of 16.9 virtual km (SD: 3.4) during the
experimental task.
Subjects were able to produce detailed accounts of what
they had been thinking during wayﬁnding. There was a
high degree of consistency in the types of thoughts across
the 20 subjects. Reviewing the transcriptions of all subjects,
and aided by a classiﬁcation guide developed during the
piloting phase, 12,484 thoughts were classiﬁed into distinct
categories (see Table 1 for examples). Not only was the
level of detail in the retrospective verbal reports very high,
subjects reviewing the video of their wayﬁnding perfor-
mance were quite clear about when exactly they had
experienced particular thoughts and in what order. This
enabled a complete speciﬁcation of the wayﬁnding
experience in terms of the onsets, durations and temporal
order of thoughts for each subject. The precision of the
timings was further tested using the independent eye-
tracking data acquired during the experimental task.
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of reports of looking at a feature in virtual London
whilst navigating were corroborated by a saccade to its
location at (or very near, 72 s) the time retrospectively
reported. In addition, agreement was found between the
two experimenters for 93% of classiﬁcations arising from
the random sample of statements that were dual-classiﬁed
(k ¼ 0.91).
3.2. Overview of how wayfinding unfolds in a familiar city
Our analysis of the verbal reports permitted a detailed
breakdown of how wayﬁnding unfolds in a familiar large
city (see Table 1, Fig. 2). In summary, we initially plan our
route to a destination; en route we might adjust our plan
because of new opportunities or obstructed paths. Some-
times we plan our route only to an intermediate point and
once reached, we then ﬁll in the rest of the route plan.
Often within a familiar environment we are almost on
automatic pilot, ‘coasting’ along without thinking. We also
set up expectations, waiting to see the next junction or a
landmark to conﬁrm we are on the right track, occasionally
inspecting the city around us as we travel through it. We
monitor the surrounding trafﬁc to achieve safe passage to
our destination, and have to be able to plan our own
actions, such as staying in a trafﬁc lane or changing lanes.
Sometimes our emotional state might change, or we pause
to consider the thoughts of the people we encounter. It is
notable how recognisable the above aspects are to our
everyday experience of urban wayﬁnding, and yet many of
them have gone largely undocumented. What one truly
appreciates from the retrospective verbal reports is how,
second by second, the underlying cognition can change
(Fig. 2). We now consider each of the thought categories in
turn, and provide qualitative characterization of their
salient features.
3.3. Route planning
Route planning is a crucial stage in wayﬁnding and it
occurred more frequently than any other category (see
Fig. 3). In Appendix A we provide detailed extracts from
verbal reports describing route planning. It was possible to
identify three sub-categories of route planning: initial
route planning, ﬁlling-in and re-planning (see Table 1). In
the current study, initial route planning was driven by
either the customers’ requests at the start of each route
or the customers’ requests for a change in destination
en route. No differences were discernable in the verbal
reports of route planning following these two causes of
initial planning. Across subjects, the occurrences and
durations of both ﬁlling-in and re-planning were similar
(see Fig. 4).
Examination of the verbal reports shows that initial
route planning involved a number of distinct stages
(see Table 1 and Appendix A). In the ﬁrst instance, the
destination’s location must be retrieved. After this, thedirection to the location must be determined. This process
was reported on by most subjects. A few subjects’
descriptions were in terms of cardinal directions (see
Extract 2, Table 1), but most described it in an egocentric
reference frame (see Extract 4, Table 1 and Extract 7,
Appendix A). For many subjects, determining the direction
is the most important aspect of the process (see Extracts 6
and 8, Appendix A). The next stage of route planning
involves street selection, and was more diverse across
routes and individuals. This ranged from only selecting
the next street, to completely specifying the streets to
the destination. Some subjects reported thinking of the
street names, while others did not (see Extracts 10–13,
Appendix A). Most often the streets selected were
described starting with the nearest street and ending with
streets close to the destination (see Extract 1, Table 1 and
Extract 5, Appendix A), but occasionally there were
reports of starting from the destination and working
backwards (see Extract 21, Appendix A). Street selection
appeared to be affected by the distance or number of
streets to the goal destination. In addition, when selecting
the streets subjects often accounted for the one-way road
trafﬁc system. The time of day and day of the week were
also important considerations as they related to road
congestion and the obstruction of streets due to street
markets. Strategies were varied, one of the most common
being to initially plan a route that would end up facing in a
direction towards the destination, and then ﬁlling in the
rest of the route (see Extracts 7 and 8, Appendix A).
Another strategy was to plan a route to a particular region
or access point and then plan the next part of the route
from there (see Extracts 23 and 24, Appendix A). When
choosing between options, some subjects reported attempt-
ing to keep it simple rather than choosing intricate
routes (see Extract 6, Table 1). Some subjects reported
planning a few different route options in case of problems
en route, and also reported re-assessing the route plan after
it had been selected (see Extracts 17, 25 and 26, Appendix
A). A few subjects described imagining driving down the
route at high speed in their ‘mind’s eye’ as part of a
checking process (see Extracts 17, 18 and 22, Appendix A).
Reports of imagery were not conﬁned to ground-level
views, but also very occasionally included aerial views
(see Extract 19, Appendix A), but no imagery of a map was
reported.
The verbal reports revealed that route planning rarely
stops after the initial plan. En route subjects often ﬁlled-in
a plan for next stage of the journey or re-planned part of
the route. These two other types of route planning were
subject to similar considerations and strategies involved in
initial route planning, but typically fewer streets and
directions were speciﬁed. Filling-in was typically precipi-
tated by having ﬁnally reached a street facing towards the
destination, reaching the end of a previously planned route
segment, or reaching a new region. Often the ﬁlling-in
commenced when the subject had ﬁnished turning into the
street they planned to reach, rather than at the moment of
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Fig. 3. Frequency of thoughts and their durations across subjects for each category: (A) the mean number of occurrences for each thought category, (B)
the mean duration of each period for each thought category and (C) the mean total duration across all routes of each thought category.
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often occurred because a street was obstructed (see Extract
7, Table 1). Several subjects commented that this was quite
a common occurrence in London. Re-planning was also
caused by subjects spontaneously realizing there was a
better route available, or very occasionally by accidentally
passing the street they intended to use (see Extract 8, Table
1). There was a lack of mental imagery in descriptions of
ﬁlling-in and re-planning.3.4. Action planning, monitoring traffic and rule
related thoughts
Once route planning is complete we need to make the
appropriate actions to reach our goal. Many actions were
made without subjects reporting any prior planning, such
as keeping the vehicle in a straight line. However, other
actions were reported to be preceded by a plan. These
action plans were distinguished from route plans by the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 4. Route planning and emotions: sub-categories. (A) The total duration of each sub-category of route planning for each subject (rank ordered by total
number of events). (B) The total duration of each sub-category of emotion for each subject (rank ordered by total number of events).
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sequence of actions, and the action was to be executed at a
location currently in view. Action planning was the second
most common category after route planning (see Fig. 3),
indicating that thinking about future events comprises a
considerable portion of the wayﬁnding experience. Many
action plans involved thoughts about turning into a street
that was currently in view and part of the route plan.
Planned actions also included: changing lanes, making
U-turns and manoeuvring round moving vehicles. Action
planning involving other trafﬁc also involved monitoring
the movements of these vehicles. Subjects also reported
monitoring the movement of vehicles on other occasions,
such as when looking out for a street, to see if it was
accessible. Buses were often a concern for the subjects,
since they provided the greatest risk of collision (see
Extract 30, Table 1). Like route planning, action planning
was also affected by road trafﬁc rules, such as the one-way
streets and road markings (see Table 1). Often these related
to inhibiting particular actions, such as complying with ‘no
stopping’ signs (see Extract 36, Table 1).3.5. Coasting
Whilst route and action planning are the thought
categories that occurred most frequently, examining total
amount of time subjects spent in each cognitive state
revealed a different story. For a good deal of the time spent
wayﬁnding in this familiar city subjects reported ‘coasting’
along without any directed thoughts (see Fig. 3). This
typically occurred on long stretches of road where subjects
knew they did not need to make any further decisions
(see Extracts 12 and 15, Table 1). Several subjects used the
terms ‘automatic pilot’ or ‘switched off’ to describe the
experience.
3.6. Visual inspection, expectation and confirmation or
violation of expectations
During any wayﬁnding excursion there are moments
when we need to look around to acquire information about
the environment. Four distinct categories related to this
were identiﬁable in the verbal reports. Some periods of
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Table 2
Results from the temporal precedence analysis
Category Sign test p-value
w2-score, p-value
Route planning
135.4, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Coasting 0.002
Rule related 0.004
Visual inspection 0.004
Was not often followed by:
Expectation conﬁrmation 0.001
Expectation violation o0.001
Coasting
75.3, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
–
Was not often followed by:
Route planning o0.001
Action planning o0.001
Rule related 0.003
Expectation conﬁrmation 0.021
Expectation violation 0.021
Action planning
92.7, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Coasting 0.002
Was not often followed by:
Expectation conﬁrmation 0.003
Expectation violation o0.001
Emotions 0.003
Visual inspection 0.008
Expectation
1048.0, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Expectation conﬁrmation o0.001
Expectation violation o0.001
Monitoring trafﬁc 0.019
Was not often followed by:
Route planning o0.001
Action planning o0.001
Coasting o0.001
Rule related o0.001
Visual inspection 0.039
Visual inspection
121.6, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Expectation conﬁrmation 0.002
Was not often followed by:
Emotions o0.001
Expectation conﬁrmation
243.0, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Action planning o0.001
Monitoring trafﬁc 0.002
Was not often followed by:
Expectation violation o0.001
Expectation 0.021
Rule related 0.039
H.J. Spiers, E.A. Maguire / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 232–249 243wayﬁnding were spent visually inspecting ﬁxed features in
the environment, while on other occasions inspection
occurred with the expectation of seeing a speciﬁc feature
not yet in view (see Table 1 and Fig. 3). Visual inspection
could occur out of a general interest in the local
environment (e.g. Extracts 26, 27 and 28, Table 1) or in
order to extract useful information from it, for example,
from road signs (e.g. Extract 29, Table 1). Expectation
periods, by contrast, involved looking out for the next
turning to execute the route plan or a landmark to conﬁrm
the subject was on the right path. Expectation periods often
commenced after turning into a street, but also after certain
amount of time had elapsed driving down a street (see
Extract 18, Table 1). Often a period of expectation would
be followed by conﬁrmation that the feature sought had
been spotted. Alternatively on occasion the expectation
was violated when, for example, the street was blocked off
or the expected feature was visually altered (e.g. scaffolding
covering up a landmark).
3.7. Theory of mind and emotions
In addition to planning, coasting and visual processing,
subjects also reported thinking about the thoughts and
intentions of other individuals (known as ‘theory of mind’)
and also reported changes in their own emotional state.
Theory of mind thoughts related to moving agents (such as
pedestrians and fellow road users), the customers, and the
experimenters. Some thoughts were concerned with actions
made, or the intentions of the customer (see Table 1), or
thinking about what others might think of their own
behaviour (see Spiers & Maguire, 2006b for more details).
Subjects also reported changes in their own emotional state
which fell into three sub-categories: happy, anxious and
angry (see Table 1). Anxious and angry thoughts domi-
nated, with some subjects identiﬁably more ‘emotional’
than others (see Fig. 4). A wide variety of causes could
induce the reported transitions into emotional states, such
as a road being blocked off (angry), getting to the
destination (happy) and nearly crashing (anxious), see
Table 1.
3.8. Temporal precedence
A temporal precedence analysis was used to test for any
temporal relationships between the thought categories. We
found that the events in some categories preceded the events
in other categories either more or less often than was
expected by chance (w2 ¼ 2402.9, df ¼ 90, po0.001). Sub-
sequent analyses revealed that the observed temporal
relationships were signiﬁcantly different from the pattern
predicted by chance for all categories except theory of mind.
These results and the results of post hoc sign tests
are reported in Table 2. To summarize, occurrences of
expectation conﬁrmation and expectation violation were
signiﬁcantly more likely to be preceded by expectation. A
signiﬁcantly greater number of action planning events were
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Table 2 (continued )
Category Sign test p-value
w2-score, p-value
Expectation violation
251.2, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Route planning o0.001
Rule related 0.007
Was not often followed by:
–
Monitoring trafﬁc
338.6, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Action planning o0.001
Expectation conﬁrmation 0.001
Was not often followed by:
Emotions 0.001
Visual inspection 0.006
Rule related
40.3, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Action planning o0.001
Was not often followed by:
Coasting 0.021
Emotions
45.2, po0.001
Was more often followed by:
Coasting 0.021
Was not often followed by:
Visual inspection 0.021
Theory of mind
Not signiﬁcant
Degrees of freedom for w2 tests ¼ 9.
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expectation conﬁrmation than would occur by chance. In
contrast, route planning was only preceded by one thought
category, expectation violation. Both action planning and
route planning frequently preceded coasting periods. Mon-
itoring trafﬁc often preceded expectation conﬁrmation and
often occurred after expectation and expectation conﬁrma-
tion periods. Several categories occurred less frequently after
others than would be predicted by chance, and generally
follow a natural logic. For example, expectation conﬁrma-
tion thoughts were not likely to be immediately followed by
periods of expectation violation.
4. Discussion
In this study we used a retrospective verbal report
protocol, eye tracking and a highly accurate virtual reality
simulation of a real familiar city to explore cognition
during wayﬁnding on a second-by-second basis. By
classifying statements in subjects’ verbal reports into a
number of pre-determined thought categories we were able
to characterize their wayﬁnding experience in terms of the
diversity, frequency, duration and temporal order ofthoughts. The high degree of correspondence between
verbal reports of looking at features in the environment
and independent eye-tracking measurements provided
support for the validity of the verbal reports. A statistical
analysis of temporal precedence of thought categories
allowed us to identify their temporal relationships.
Combining this information with a detailed qualitiative
examination of the verbal reports, we now evaluate the
ability of extant cognitive models to capture the rich
wayﬁnding process we have revealed, as well as comparing
our ﬁndings with those from previous wayﬁnding studies
that employed verbal report protocols.
Cognitive models of wayﬁnding share a number of core
features. Our ﬁnding of distinct route planning and action
planning processes, and that these two categories occurred
most frequently, lends support to the notion that these two
stages form a central core of wayﬁnding cognition (Garling
et al., 1984; Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Passini,
1981, 1984; Peponis et al., 1990; Stern & Portugali, 1999;
Timpf et al., 1992). Examination of the verbal reports of
initial planning revealed that it was composed of three
sequential stages: (1) retrieving the location of the
destination, (2) determining the direction to the destination
and (3) retrieval/selection of the streets to form the route.
Sequential processing of information as part of initial route
planning is a common feature in the cognitive models.
However, some models generally ignore the ﬁrst two
stages, focusing instead on the selection of places and
paths (e.g. Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Timpf et al.,
1992). By contrast, the models of Garling et al. (1984) and
Passini (1992, 1984) both involve retrieval of information
prior to planning. However, the stages in Garling et al.’s
(1984) model differ from those we found. In their model the
ﬁrst stage involves the retrieval of all the relevant
information (destination and paths), and subsequent stages
deal with the selection of places and the paths linking them.
This difference may relate to the fact that Garling et al’s
(1984) model was devised to deal with the problem of
navigating to a sequence of multiple destinations, where
the order in which the destinations can be visited needs
planning. In this context it is useful to retrieve the locations
of all destinations and possible paths ﬁrst in order to decide
which paths are optimal. Our data suggest that when single
destinations are considered the location of the destination
is retrieved ﬁrst and then the subsequent stages occur
subsequently.
Another feature of route planning under emphasized in
many models is the requirement to determine the direction to
the destination. Our subjects often noted that this was a very
salient component of initial route planning. This makes sense
if we consider that wayﬁnding will fail without it, and in
some situations knowing only the direction may be sufﬁcient
to reach the goal (see Spiers & Maguire, 2007b for further
discussion). The lack of emphasis of getting the right
direction in verbal reports of route planning in previous
studies may relate to the use of indoor environments, where
the next waypoint may be visible from the outset.
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selecting the streets, contributed most to subjects’ route
planning descriptions and it also features most prominently
in wayﬁnding models (Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers, 1978;
Kuipers et al., 2003; Passini, 1981, 1984; Peponis et al.,
1990; Stern & Portugali, 1999; Timpf et al., 1992). The
models of Kuipers (1978, 2003) and Timpf et al. (1992)
consider route planning as the construction of a set of
instructions for movement between places along paths in a
cognitive map stored in memory. In agreement with such
models, the verbal reports often contained a speciﬁcation
of the paths (streets) and directions (left, right) necessary to
reach the destination. Similar to the models, the travel
instructions were mostly speciﬁed starting near the current
location and progress, street by street, towards the goal
(Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003;
Passini, 1981, 1984; Timpf et al., 1992). The fact that many
routes were not completely speciﬁed is also consistent
with the partial planning suggested in several models
(e.g. Garling et al., 1984; Passini, 1981, 1984) and similar
observations in previous studies (Holscher et al., 2007;
Passini, 1981, 1984). Passini’s (1981, 1984) model draws the
distinction between this process of retrieving the map of the
environment to select the streets and the direct retrieval of
stored instructions for very familiar routes. Our data
generally support this distinction, in that for some routes
no streets were speciﬁed and subjects stated they just knew
where to go. This also agrees with previous reports of the
rapid ‘automatic’ route choices made by experienced taxi
drivers (Chase, 1982; Pailhous, 1970, 1984). However, our
data also serve to highlight that even in familiar environ-
ments planning routes to some destinations can be very
detailed, with multiple factors considered and strategies
used.
A number of strategies for aiding route planning have
been identiﬁed in previous studies and incorporated into
some cognitive models (e.g. Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers,
1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Timpf et al., 1992). By strategy
we mean the use of a particular heuristic or switching of
behaviour that is not a requirement for the task but
improves performance or frees up cognitive resources.
Some strategies we identiﬁed could be related to those
previously described, while others were novel and not
previously reported. In Passini’s (1981, 1984) model
decisions are hierarchical, organized with over arching
goals at the top-level and sub-goals beneath. This was not a
dominant feature of the route plans of our subjects. This
difference may relate to the fact that Passini’s model is
based the verbal reports of navigation inside buildings
(see also Holscher et al., 2007). However, one strategy
reported did ﬁt this approach: initially planning a route to
end up facing in the direction toward the destination before
planning the full route. The layout of the environment and
the route requirements have also been suggested to
inﬂuence route planning strategies (Conroy-Dalton, 2003;
Holscher et al., 2007; Wiener & Mallot, 2003; Wiener et al.,
2004). The least-decision-load strategy (Wiener et al., 2004)was observed in descriptions where subjects opted for the
simpler route when choosing between two similar route
options. The ﬁne-to-coarse heuristic (Wiener & Mallot,
2003) was also evident in the reports of subjects who ﬁrst
selected the region in which the destination lay and then
planned the route to that region, and the partial planning
was for routes covering large distances. Strategies we
identiﬁed that are not obviously speciﬁed in models
included re-checking the route once it has been selected,
using ground-level mental imagery of moving through
the streets to see if it is correct, and the planning of multiple
route options in case of problems. The use of mental
imagery in navigation has been reported in some
studies (Gerber & Kwan, 1994; Passini, 1984), but not
others (e.g. Chebat et al., 2005). Gerber and Kwan’s (1994)
observation that some subjects visualized the next ﬁve
streets ahead is consistent with the reports from some of
our subjects. Like taxi drivers from Paris and Chicago,
London taxi drivers do not appear to use bird’s eye
imagery of a map for planning routes (Chase, 1982;
Pailhous, 1970, 1984). Thus, if survey-like representations
(Siegel & White, 1975; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982;
Tolman, 1948) support wayﬁnding on some routes in
familiar environments, they do not take the form of mental
images of maps.
Another strategy, deduced from the study of Parisian
taxi drivers, is the use of primary street networks to
facilitate wayﬁnding (Pailhous, 1970, 1984). Chase (1982)
found no evidence for such a strategy in studies of Chicago
taxi drivers. Similarly in our data there is no evidence for
an explicit use of this strategy. However, the representation
may be more subtle. Recently, a retired taxi driver with
damage to his hippocampus bilaterally (patient TT) was
tested on his navigation in the virtual simulation of
London used in the current study (Maguire, Nannery, &
Spiers, 2006). Patient TT could only navigate accurately
when the destinations could be reached using predomi-
nantly the main arterial ‘A’ roads. Thus, it may be that
when navigational ability is compromised, a primary
coarse network of London’s major streets is retained and
helps to support residual navigational ability.
All models distinguish between the need to form an
initial route plan and make further plans en route. Most
focus on re-planning caused by changes to the environ-
ment, such as a street being blocked off. Our temporal
precedence analysis showed that indeed route planning
events were more often preceded by expectation violation
events than would be predicted by chance. Re-planning
could also be driven by subjects spontaneously realizing
there was a better option or by missing a turning,
additional reasons not considered in the models. A few
models draw the distinction between ﬁlling-in and re-
planning (Passini, 1981, 1984; Wiener & Mallot, 2003). Our
ﬁnding that ﬁlling-in often occurs after the subject had
entered a new street rather than as soon as this street was
spotted does not feature in any model. Such a delay may
relate to the subjects cognitive resources being taken up
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turn into the street.
Several models highlight the importance of the link
between the observation of an expected landmark/view
(expectation conﬁrmation) and a cue to perform a
particular action (action planning) (Garling et al., 1984;
Kuipers, 1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Stern and Portugali,
1999; Timpf et al., 1992). Our temporal precedence analysis
provides direct support for this link. It also revealed that in
the context of driving it is not just static features of the
environment that can initiate this process. We found
monitoring trafﬁc often preceded expectation conﬁrma-
tions. Examining the verbal reports suggested this was
mostly caused by monitoring the trafﬁc on the road ahead
to detect the next street in the route plan and then
monitoring their movements after the street had been
detected to assess its accessibility. This relationship
between monitoring trafﬁc and navigational cues was not
predicted by models involving vehicle driving (Kuipers,
1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Timpf et al., 1992).
The existence of periods of expectation during naviga-
tion replicates similar observations in from previous studies
employing verbal reports (Chebat et al., 2005; Holscher
et al., 2007; Passini 1981, 1984). However, unlike Passini’s
verbal reports, there was no indication from our subjects
that they were holding a mental image in mind during these
periods. Our results revealed that expectation was not the
only state that subjects were occupied by during wayﬁnd-
ing. The most common state to be in was in fact coasting
along, not thinking directed thoughts. Given its prevalence,
it is surprising that this category was not identiﬁed in
previous studies examining verbal reports in wayﬁnding
tasks (Chebat et al., 2005; Dogu & Erkip, 2000; Gerber &
Kwan, 1994; Holscher et al., 2007; Kato & Takeuchi, 2003;
Passini, 1981, 1984; Titus & Everett, 1996). One likely
reason for this is that many of the previous studies used
concurrent ‘think aloud’ verbal report protocols. In ‘think
aloud’ procedures, coasting periods would have been
observed as gaps between utterances and thus not
necessarily classiﬁed.
Another category missing from the descriptions in
previous studies and models are thoughts relating to visual
inspection, where subjects reported looking at a particular
ﬁxed feature in the environment. After coasting, visual
inspection accounted for more time during the task than
the other thought categories. Some models include the need
to update information from signs or environmental
features (Garling et al., 1984; Passini, 1981, 1984), which
would fall into this category. However, this only represents
one possible reason for visual inspection. Many of the
statements involved looking at features such as statues,
shops and large buildings simply out of curiosity, rather
than to gain speciﬁc information. Thus, visual inspection
may relate partly to keeping oriented in the environment,
but also to generally looking at features out of interest.
Whilst visual processing of the environment has received
little attention in the models, other aspects of cognition weidentiﬁed in our study are completely absent in the models.
The categories emotions and theory of mind were reported
by all subjects. While these may not be necessary for
successful wayﬁnding, they are not irrelevant to it. For
instance, it is often useful to be able to predict/interpret the
actions of other people, since they may know something
important about the environment. For example observing
someone reversing out of a street might lead you to wonder
why they chose to take that action—perhaps the street
beyond is blocked. Wayﬁnding can be stressful, particu-
larly when it involves driving in a large city where road
rage is a too frequent occurrence. The observation that
angry and anxious thoughts dominate the emotional
experience conﬁrms that this was the case for many of
the subjects in the current experiment.
To summarize, our ﬁndings agree with many compo-
nents of current models of wayﬁnding, but also reveal
new features not captured by them. The sequential and
hierarchical nature of route planning outlined in models
was evident in our data. As were the distinctions between
route planning and action planning, and between initial
route planning and spontaneous route planning. We
observed several previously described route planning
strategies, including the least-decision-load strategy
(Wiener et al., 2004) and the ﬁne-to-coarse planning
heuristic (Wiener & Mallot, 2003). Several models pre-
dicted the sequence of thoughts: expectation, expectation
conﬁrmation and action planning, which were related to
carrying out the route plan (Garling et al., 1984; Kuipers,
1978; Kuipers et al., 2003; Passini, 1981, 1984). Aspects of
our data not captured in the models include certain
components of route planning, monitoring trafﬁc to
detect the next waypoint, and the under-emphasis of visual
processing and other cognitive states during wayﬁnding.
With regard to route planning, extant models fail to reﬂect
the importance of determining the direction to the
destination. We found no evidence for the use of a primary
network of roads to facilitate route planning (Kuipers
et al., 2003; Pailhous, 1970; Pailhous 1984), but instead
we found a number of other strategies including planning
the route to a location facing towards the destination
and then planning the rest of the route. Overall, our
results indicate that wayﬁnding involves much more than
simply planning, and carrying out plans. It can evoke a
range of emotions, spark interest in the surrounding
environment and lead one to consider the thoughts of
fellow wayﬁnders.
In conclusion, much of our day-to-day wayﬁnding
behaviour takes place in familiar urban environments. By
combining interactive virtual reality and retrospective
verbal reports, the complexity and dynamic nature of the
cognition behind wayﬁnding in a well-known busy city has
been revealed. Our ﬁndings lend some support to extant
models of wayﬁnding, but also suggest that they might
require revision to account for the diversity and temporal
order of thoughts, as well as additional wayﬁnding
strategies. In the future, further use and development of
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means to interpret wayﬁnding behaviour.
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Appendix A. Examples of route planning from the
verbal reports
Examples of route planning from the verbal reports are
given in the following table:
Planning familiar routes
Extract 1: Sub. 17
Because I’ve worked the area [Soho] so much, it’s
automatic. If you get regular things it’s automatic, you
don’t really have to think about it, you know it better than
your own front room. When you go in your front room
you don’t think: ‘‘I’ll go and switch the television on, where
is it?’’
Extract 2: Sub. 1
Sometimes when you’re out on the road, you do it [route
planning] instantly without even thinking
Extract 3: Sub. 2
Well, it’s an instinct and familiarity really. You’ve done
it so often that it doesn’t really test your brain. Obviously
some do. It’s only when you get sort of difﬁcult ones, or
possibly places you’ve not been for a long while. And then
you’re actually thinking all the way along. I had one last
week that I’ve not been through in 20 years and the names
came back and I still found it
Extract 4: Sub. 3
Do you want to know one of the worst things about
driving a cab? You have a lot of time to think. Not about
the job because that comes instinctively, to think about
other things. People say ‘‘oh I’m too busy at work, I
haven’t been able to think about that’’ I have all day. I
spend more time thinking about other things, this [route
planning] clicks in very quickly
Extract 5: Sub. 6
It’s virtually instanty As you change the path of that
vehicle you’ve made your mind up, basically, for 90% of
the route. And that one’s only three streets in my book.
Strand, Fleet Street, Ludgate Hill, I’m thereDetermining the direction
Extract 6: Sub. 2
Basically, you’ve got to be like ay a weather vane.
You’ve actually got to be facing in the right direction, and
that’s the art of it, really. It is an instantaneous reaction as
to where you’re making for, really. Because you can’t sit
there wondering, getting a book out wondering whether
you’ve got to turn around or do a U-turn or left. It’s got to
be an instant reaction
Extract 7: Sub. 17
You can actually think too hard, and if you think too
hard—you can’t think. So what you do is you say well, the
Middlesex Hospital is back that way, so you don’t panic
the brain, you leave the brain free and then what you do is
you turn it and point it in the right direction and then you
start sorting it out
Extract 8: Sub. 18
The important thing when I start is to be heading in the
right direction and then that gives you enough time to sort
of think as to where you go. So sometimes it’s made up as
you go along as well
Extract 9: Sub. 1
As I said, you tend to follow your nose and trust your
instinct because you know that you’re going in the general
direction
Verbalizing street names
Extract 10:
Experimenter
And are you thinking the street names?
Sub. 6
Yes, yes, yes. Deﬁnitely, yes
Extract 11:
Experimenter
Do you think through the names of the streets?
Sub. 20
Not verbally, it’s quicker than that. You haven’t got time
to verbalize
Extract 12: Sub. 2
I don’t think, oh, I’ll turn left Duncannon Street into the
Strand, left into the Aldwych, left into, er, Catherine Street.
However, that’s how you do it at the Carriage Ofﬁce
[examination centre for the licence] because that’s the only
way they know that you know where you are going. You
don’t obviously think that way when you’re driving, you
just sort of do it. It’s just automatic, really
Extract 13: Sub. 3
I’m sure I was much more worried when I ﬁrst started
and I would have probably remembered the names of all
the streets I was going down and would be going down,
whereas now it’s far more automatic
Filling-in the next stage of the journey
Extract 14: Sub. 3
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make a decision until I get closer towards the end. That’s
how it works
Extract 15: Sub. 17
What I’m actually doing is allowing myself time—this is
very delicate, I never knew it was as delicate as this—but
what you’re actually doing is: instead of taking the whole
route in one go, you’re take a safe step forward to the next
one to reappraize where you’re going to go and then it
gives you time to think and to relax. And then what you do
is you take the next stage stepping stone, but by then
you’ve always got it, you’ve had enough time to zoom it in
Extract 16: Sub. 18
Once you’ve got the basic plan in your head and you just
ﬁll in the detail as you go along
Mental imagery
Extract 17: Sub. 17
And that’s all visual in my mind. When I do it here, I
zigzag visually, so I do a fast forward. The nearest you can
get to it is very, veryy less than a second, very, very fast I
go de-de-de-de-de that ﬁts. So in my mind I’m going very
fast visually and I’m seeing the streets, not from a plan
bird’s eye view, but just forward fast, left, right and it’s
done. It’s done as quick as that, but it’s visual. It’s
checking—yes, that’s it, that’ll work
Extract 18: Sub. 6
You see it likey it’s like a Schumacher run [Formula
one motor car race]. Yes. It’s just like that. And you see it in
your mind. Jun, jun, jun, It’s done in seconds. Because of
the nature of the job, you’ve also got to concentrate on
controlling the vehicle and putting it in the right location to
do that journey
Extract 19: Sub. 17
I’ve got an over-patched picture of Peter Street. It
sounds daft, but I don’t view it from ground level, it was
slightly up and I could see the whole area as though I was
about 50 foot up. And I saw Peter Street, I saw the market
and I knew I had to get down to Peter Street
Extract 20:
Experimenter
Were you imagining driving all the way down to the Old
Bailey?
Sub. 17
No, it’s too easy. It’s just the Strand, Fleet Street, do a
left. I didn’t have to with that one
Extract 21: Sub. 18
I’d pictured the hospital up just off Great Portland Street
then I brought it back to the Marylebone Road, then I
turned round
Extract 22: Sub. 20
I think you do think in images. Maybe you ﬁll in details
and overlay it with words and things later because, I mean,
your brain works in images. What I think, when you say aplace like Royal Courts of Justice, I’m thinking what
street’s it in, that’s the ﬁrst thingyThat’s how everyone
sort of learns it initially, so Royal Courts of Justice is in the
Strand. That’s what I’m thinking initially and then I’m
thinking both, what road it’s in or what it looks like. So it
could be either option. The Royal Courts of Justice, I
probably thought the Strand; then I pictured it. If it doesn’t
snap in to perspective straightaway you normally need a
keyword, the two things go together to pick up a memory
somewhere. When it works, instantly then you’ve got like a
snap, if you like, ﬂashing ziggly, zaggly line and you can ﬁll
in the detail as you go along. And it’s more or less right
Navigating by region
Extract 23: Sub. 1
There are various points in London where there are only
one way in and one way out and when you do the
knowledge, even though I did it 20 years ago, you learn
those ways in and they stick
Extract 24: Sub. 15
You take a region and head for the region ﬁrst and then
sort of branch out
Considering options and re-assessing
Extract 25: Sub. 18
I pretty much know what I’m going to do and what I’m
going to come across and also just bearing in mind that
some roads are closed. I’ve got at the back of my mind
maybe another alternative route just in case ofy the roads,
the roads are closed. I remember someone did say to me
once when I ﬁrst started he said just have a couple of
options just in case there is trafﬁc, you can’t do a speciﬁc
turn or something
Extract 26: Sub. 18
Obviously once you’ve got the route, then you double
check it several times in your head. Because sometimes, you
know, you’ve got it in place and you’re getting there and
you think, no, hang on, that’s completely wrong.
Statements in square brackets and italics provide
additional information to clarify what the preceding
statements refer to. Statements in parentheses and italics
provide information about a subject’s behaviour.
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